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We propose a schema that characterizes how parts constitute wholes at diverse levels
of organization, ranging from the atomic to the biological to the social. This schema of
tags, organizers, attachers, and communicators provides a unified understanding of the
structure, function, and dynamics of organization in physics, biology, and the cognitive and
social sciences. We use this schema to identify and describe structures and processes
at many levels of organization, and discuss its relevance for understanding the nature of
constitution and emergence, especially the relation between individual humans and the
social groups they constitute.
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INTRODUCTION
Part-whole relations are important in all sciences, ranging from
physics, where atoms are composed of electrons and other par-
ticles, to sociology, where groups are composed of individual
people. Relations of constitution are especially central to bio-
logical theories that investigate how molecules make up cells,
how cells make up organs, how organs make up organisms,
and how organisms make up populations. Many biologists have
stressed the importance of hierarchies of organization in liv-
ing systems (e.g., Woodger, 1929; Novikoff, 1945; MacMahon
et al., 1978; Miller, 1978; Mayr, 1982; Eldredge, 1985; Zylstra,
1992; Heylighen, 2000; McShea, 2001; Valentine, 2003; Korn,
2005; Lane, 2006; Pavé, 2006). Similarly, many cognitive sci-
entists have considered thinking at biological and social levels
as well as psychological ones (e.g., Simon, 1962, 1996; Newell,
1990; Churchland and Sejnowski, 1992; Holland, 1998; Thagard,
2006). Philosophers of science have discussed how the organiza-
tion of entities at multiple levels can be relevant to explaining
biological and cognitive operations (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson,
1993; Thagard, 1999, 2010; McCauley and Bechtel, 2001; Bunge,
2003; Darden, 2006; Craver, 2007; Craver and Bechtel, 2007;
Wimsatt, 2007; Bechtel, 2008; McCauley, 2009; Winther, 2011).
Nevertheless, the nature of part-whole relations has largely been
taken for granted, with little systematic attempt to say how com-
ponents at a lower level of organization constitute wholes at a
higher level.
We propose a general schema that characterizes how parts
make up wholes at all levels of organization. To put it concisely,
parts have identifying tags that allow organizers, attachers, and
communicators to make the parts work together as a whole.
Constitution is not a static relation between parts and wholes, but
rather a combination of processes in which the parts interact to
compose and maintain the whole. Such dynamics help to explain
the relationship between individual people and social groups such
as families.
A PART-WHOLE SCHEMA
We conjecture that part-whole relations at all levels arise from the
following factors:
1. Parts are the units that assemble together to form a whole.
2. Tags are properties of parts that give structural and/or func-
tional identities.
3. Organizers are forces or processes that bring parts together into
structural and/or functional relationships.
4. Attachers are forces, processes, or entities that hold parts
together.
5. Communicators are specialized components that move to allow
interactions among physically separated parts.
6. Wholes are structures made of parts that together operate as
a system; wholes can also function as parts in higher-level
wholes.
In this schema, parts have identities based on their tags that deter-
mine how they are brought together into specific arrangements
by organizers. Parts are held together by attachers, and the oper-
ation of wholes is also influenced by communication between
physically separated parts. Figure 1 illustrates how tags, orga-
nizers, attachers, and communicators, enable parts to constitute
a whole.
The process of organization can be understood by analogy to
the familiar human practice of construction. Composing biologi-
cal wholes like molecules and cells is roughly like building an item
of furniture such as a table. Building a table (the whole) from
pieces of wood (the parts) requires tags, organizers, and attach-
ers. Each piece of wood has tags based on its dimensions and type,
for example, a 2-by-4 piece of cherry. Organizers that shape and
arrange the pieces include processes such as sawing, hammering,
and clamping. Finally, the attachers are nails and glues that hold
the table together. Organizers differ from attachers in that the
former are forces or processes that bring parts together, whereas
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the latter are forces, processes, or things that hold parts together
in a continuing pattern. Builders use organizers like hammering
to bring parts together, and attachers like nails to make them stay
together.
Two key differences exist between biological systems and arti-
facts like tables. First, biological wholes are rarely assembled or
made functional by the laying out of individual parts and sub-
sequent stepwise assembly of these parts. Instead, some wholes
such as tissues, organs, and organ systems develop together,
while other wholes such as atoms do not need to be assem-
bled within an organism. Second, while many pieces of furniture
and appliances manufactured by humans are static wholes, all
levels of biological organization require ongoing and dynamic
interactions to both establish and maintain the structure and
function of biological entities. Unlike artifacts, biological sys-
tems are self-organizing and self-maintaining. Dynamics at a
given level govern the replacement of components over time
and their movement within a whole. While components of a
structure like a table rarely need to be replaced, the biological
world consists of wholes with parts that are continuously being
FIGURE 1 | Organization at a given level. Squares represent components
with different tags represented by different shades. The organizers arrow
represents ongoing processes that pattern the structural and functional
arrangement of parts into a whole. Circles represent attachers. Stars
represent communicators that move between parts as indicated by curved
arrows.
replenished: new parts are synthesized, tagged, organized, and
attached to maintain the structural and functional integrity of the
whole.
LEVELS OF ORGANIZATION
We will now show how the part-whole schema applies at many
different levels of organization. Many biologists, cognitive scien-
tists, and philosophers have offered accounts of relevant levels,
including one author who proposes that life includes 19 different
subsystems (Miller, 1978). Figure 2 depicts some of the levels that
we think are most needed for explaining important phenomena.
Muchmore detailed accounts of the parts and wholes at each level
will be given below.
Table 1 telegraphically summarizes how the part-whole
schema applies at each of the levels in Figure 2. Details about
the relevant tags, organizers, attachers, and communicators are
given in the following discussion of how relations of constitution
connect levels of organization. A fuller account of the processes
that make parts into wholes would need to specify the environ-
ments in which they operate including the interactions between
external entities and internal parts. In addition to the dynamism
of part-whole relations discussed here, there are also changes at
multiple levels of organization across evolutionary time. Indeed,
evolution is driven by variation and the natural selection of bene-
ficial traits that collectively define a complex organism. Note that
some examples in Table 1 apply only to the main structural whole
(e.g., cells) and not functional sub-level wholes (e.g., organelles).
Table 1 provides typical examples of part-whole relations, not an
exhaustive list.
Different presentations of the somatic hierarchy vary in what
levels are included. Here we classify entities as either “main
levels” or “sub-levels” based on two distinct classes of rela-
tionship between entities. The class of relationship depends on
three factors: exclusivity of composition, autonomy, and struc-
tural/functional nature. Importantly, the classification of an
entity as a main level or sub-level is not meant to be rigid, but
is simply a best fit based on these three factors and involves some
degree of arbitrariness (Zylstra, 1992).
FIGURE 2 | The levels of organization most relevant to humans. Moving
up or to the right represents a higher level of organization. Arrows represent
ongoing dynamics that establish and/or maintain structure and function. Black
arrows represent relations between primarily structural parts and wholes,
while gray arrows represent primarily functional collections of parts within a
structural whole. The “+” sign indicates that lower level entities can be
grouped into higher level ones in ways different from the basic part-whole
relation.
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Table 1 | Examples of major tags, organizers, attachers, and communicators for various levels of organization.
Parts Whole Tags Organizers Attachers Communicators
Subatomic
particles
(protons,
neutrons,
electrons)
Atom • Physical properties
(e.g., mass and charge)
• The four fundamental
forces (strong nuclear,
electromagnetism,
weak nuclear, gravity)
• Field carriers of the
fundamental forces
(gluons, photons, weak
gauge bosons,
gravitons)
• Quantum
entanglement
Atoms Molecule • Electron density
• Proximity to other
atoms
• Brownian motion
• Chemical reactions
• Covalent bonds
• Hydrogen bonds
• van der Waals
interactions
• Hydrophobic effects
(e.g., in protein folding)
• None
Molecules Organelle/cell • Physical and chemical
properties
• Sequence identity
• Localization sequences
• Post-translational
modifications
• Energetically and
physically favorable
interactions
• Intracellular transport
• Chemical reactions
(signal transduction,
metabolism)
• Cell division
• Attractive forces
between components
•Membranes
• The cytosol
• The cytoskeleton
• Proteins/enzymes
• Electrons
• Ions
• Small molecules (e.g.,
ATP)
• mRNA
Cells and cellular
products
Tissue/organ • Location
• Cell surface Molecules
• Differentiation state
(e.g., polarity,
secretions)
• Cellular processes
(e.g., migration,
polarization,
differentiation)
• Cell signaling
• Developmental
processes (e.g.,
organogenesis)
• Interlocking
membranes
• Junctions
• Extracellular matrix
components
• Connective tissue
•Motile cells
• Ions
• Small molecules
(e.g., growth factors,
neurotransmit-ters)
Organs Organ sys-
tem/individual
organism
• Embryonic origin
(ectoderm, mesoderm,
endoderm)
• Location
• Connections
• Special abilities
• Developmental
programs
•Movement of
substances through
networks (e.g., blood
flow)
• Cavities
• Connective tissues
•Membranes
• Small molecules (e.g.,
hormones)
• Specialized connective
tissues (blood and
lymph)
Individual
organisms
Social group • Physical features
• Behavioral
characteristics
• Mental representation
• Social events (e.g.,
parties, meetings,
rituals)
• Institutions and
organizations (e.g.,
universities,
corporations)
• Cognitive processes
(e.g., planning)
• Shared environments
(e.g., houses,
churches)
• Emotional mental
states
• Social practices
• Sounds
• Gestures
• Speech
•Media
First, we take as a main level the lowest level entity that a whole
must be broken down into to account for its entire structure. For
example, cells are not made entirely of organelles, but are made
entirely of molecules. Therefore molecules and cells are main lev-
els, and organelles are a sub-level. Second, the main levels of
this organization are entities related by “whole–whole” relations
(Zylstra, 1992). These entities have a relative degree of autonomy
and are a distinct unit. The sub levels of this organization rep-
resent “part-whole” relationships. These entities have an identity
only within the context of the whole they make up. To borrow
an analogy from Zylstra, a whole–whole relation relates furni-
ture such as chairs and tables to the house that they are found in.
Tables are functional wholes themselves, and it is easy to imagine
a table being functional in the absence of a house, yet tables
are still key functional components of houses. Conversely, part-
whole relationships describe how walls and floors of the house
relate to the house that they combine together to form. The walls
and floors of a house do not have much utility or autonomy
independent of the structure that they collectively constitute.
Third, main levels are entities that take on a well-defined struc-
ture, while sub-levels are often functional collections of lower
level entities with a dispersed or irregular structure. For exam-
ple, a cell (a main level) has a well-defined structure defined by a
membrane that encapsulates its contents. However, organelles (a
sub-level) such as the Golgi apparatus exist as a network of bodies
that do not take on a well-defined structure within the cell.
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Our part-whole schema of tags, organizers, attachers, and
communicators is intended to be ontological as well as con-
ceptual and epistemological. All levels of organization require
ongoing dynamic interactions to establish andmaintain structure
and function. Biological entities often display structure-function
duality. For example, cells are a main structural unit of organ-
isms in constituting bones, muscles, and connective tissue, but
are also responsible for carrying out physiological tasks such as
metabolism, protein production, and waste disposal. Thus it is
important that the assembly schema in Figure 1 represents both
structural and functional components of biological organization
and the integral relationship between these two realms, as advo-
cated by Zylstra (1992). A component such as a protein molecule
can be a part of a higher level structure such as a cell, but that
same proteinmolecule can also double as a functional component
of a higher level mechanism such as cell metabolism. Similarly,
components can be tagged to determine how they will fit together
structurally, or which other components they will interact with
in a mechanism. Organizers bring both structural and functional
components into higher level structures and/or mechanisms.
APPLICATIONS OF THE PART-WHOLE SCHEMA
Let us see in more detail how these principles apply to particular
cases of constitution.
SUBATOMIC PARTICLES INTO ATOMS
We start at the level of subatomic particles, where electrons,
protons, and neutrons and other components are arranged into
whole atoms (Martin, 2009). At this level the tags are the phys-
ical properties of the particles such as mass and charge. The
organizers are the four fundamental forces that explain the inter-
actions of subatomic particles based on the mass and charge
that tag them. These forces are, in order of decreasing relative
strength, the strong nuclear force, electromagnetism, the weak
nuclear force, and gravity. These organizers are physically man-
ifested in field carriers that mediate each fundamental force; the
strong nuclear force by gluons, electromagnetism by photons, the
weak nuclear force by the weak gauge bosons, and gravity by
gravitons, although the existence of gravitons has not yet been
experimentally confirmed. Therefore it makes sense to think of
these field carriers as the physical attachers holding electrons, pro-
tons, and neutrons into atoms. The graviton is the only attacher
that manifests an exclusively attractive force.
The dynamics of subatomic particles can be quite compli-
cated, but some simple instances can be mentioned. Electrons
are not present in static positions or even regular orbits around
nuclei. Additionally, the subatomic organizers and attachers must
be continuously active to maintain the structure and function of
atoms. Hence the constitution of atoms by subatomic particles is
a highly dynamic process.
ATOMS INTO MOLECULES
Atoms are parts that are tagged with an electron density or net
charge that dictates their tendency to undergo chemical reac-
tions that group atoms into molecules. The organizers at this
level include the randommovement of atoms known as Brownian
motion, the sharing of electrons between atoms of different
molecules in energetically favorable ways, and enzymes that
enhance the rate of many biologically relevant chemical reactions.
Chemical reactions generate attachers in the form of chemical
bonds that form between atoms. Covalent bonds are relatively
very strong and more permanent; hydrogen bonds are individ-
ually relatively weak and transient, but collectively strong and
more permanent; and van der Waals interactions are individually
very weak, but of significant strength for large molecules (Alberts
et al., 2004). Although collections of individual atoms are rarely
laid out and systematically assembled into large biomolecules, the
same tags, organizers, and attachers can explain the formation
of large macromolecules, often from smaller molecular compo-
nents. Indeed, some of the most important biomolecules such
as nucleic acids and proteins consist of long polymer chains of
smaller monomer molecules. Importantly, this structure helps
define the function of these molecules. For example, secondary
and tertiary protein structure is heavily influenced by the order
and properties of the amino acid subunits that make up a protein.
Similarly, the genetic code is defined by the sequence of nucleotide
subunits (A, T, G, and C) that make up a DNA molecule.
The relations between atoms in molecules are dynamic given
that free atoms as well as those in molecules always exhibit
some form of motion, whether vibrational, rotational, or trans-
lational. Additionally, the electron components of atoms that
participate in chemical bonds are far from static as discussed
above. Therefore, the part-whole relations in molecules are highly
dynamic in nature. The molecular reactants and products of
biochemical reactions exist in equilibrium, so the reaction con-
tinues but reaches a state where the forward and reverse reactions
proceed at the same rate.
MOLECULES INTO ORGANELLES AND CELLS
Many molecules within the cell are grouped into discrete func-
tional compartments known as organelles. While the most famil-
iar of these structures include the membrane-bound nucleus,
endoplasmic reticulum, and mitochondria (Alberts et al., 2004),
some texts also recognize large molecules within the cell as
non-membranous organelles (Martini et al., 2006). Organelles
represent a sub-level of biological organization since cells are
also composed of molecules that constitute both the intracellu-
lar space between organelles known as the cytosol, as well as the
cell membrane.
The arrangement of molecules into both organelles and entire
cells involves a variety of tags. Often simple chemical proper-
ties of molecular components such as electrostatic charge or the
ability to form hydrogen bonds with other molecules serve as
tags for organization (Alberts et al., 2004). In other cases such
as protein interactions, additional tags such as three dimen-
sional shape determine the tolerated array of structural and
functional relationships. More amazingly, protein molecules can
contain sorting signals within their amino acid sequence that
direct them to a specific organelle within the cell. Additional
molecular tags include modifications to a protein after it has
been synthesized or translated from the genetic code, known
as post-translational modifications. These modifications involve
the addition of different chemical groups by different enzymes
that quite literally tag the protein. Phosphorylation is the main
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modification used in intracellular signaling cascades and is often
used to activate or deactivate a given enzyme (Voet et al., 2008).
Another widespread modification is the acetylation of histones
that diminishes the attractive force between these proteins and
DNA, allowing increased gene expression (Alberts et al., 2004).
The arrangement of molecules into functional organelles and
cells depends on a number of organizers. Organization involves
cooperation between passive principles such as energetically and
physically favorable arrangements of molecular components, and
more active cellular processes. The cell membrane is an exam-
ple of this complementarity. The phospholipid components of
cell membranes spontaneously form a bilayer due to the amphi-
pathic nature of phospholipids that have a hydrophobic tail and
a hydrophilic head region. However, active processes such as
biosynthetic chemical reactions and cell division are also required
to build and maintain cell membranes. Major cellular processes
such as metabolism, signal transduction, and intracellular trans-
port are all important organizers.
To physically hold tagged molecular components together into
organelles and cells, nature needs attachers. Some molecules are
able to associate based primarily on their own properties and pas-
sive organizers as discussed above. However, there are two other
attachers that are found throughout the cell. The cytosol is an
attacher since it is packed with an abundance of molecules that
give it a gel-like consistency and support embedded organelles.
Another widespread attacher is the cytoskeleton that is made
up of actin, intermediate filaments, and microtubules, that help
maintain the shape and structural integrity of the cell.
Communicators within organelles and cells are involved in the
functionality of these entities by moving to mediate interactions
between physically separate parts. For example, enzymes in sig-
naling pathways mediate the effects of an extracellular growth
factor on gene transcription in the nucleus, even though the
particular growth factor and gene never have a direct physical
interaction. In mitochondria, the movement of protons (H+)
across the inner membrane connects events of the electron trans-
port chain with the generation ATP, the cell’s energy currency.
Other communicators such as messenger RNA also allow genetic
programs stored as DNA within the nucleus to affect cellular
processes throughout the cell by directing protein synthesis.
From the examples of organizers above, it is quite obvious that
the relationship between molecules and the cell is highly dynamic.
Additionally, sincemanymolecules such as proteins usually have a
finite lifespan, even terminally differentiated cells need to remain
metabolically active to maintain their structural and functional
integrity. Along with being regenerated, such molecules must be
actively tagged, organized, attached, and moved if they are to be
communicators. Many molecular components are also in con-
stant motion within the cell. This motion can take the form of
passive diffusion through the cytoplasm or an organelle complex,
or it can be directed by active intracellular transport. In the latter
case, microtubules that are polymers of a protein known as tubu-
lin, along with motor proteins, provide a transportation infras-
tructure within the cell, along which organelles can be moved.
Such movement is important in processes such as the establish-
ment of cell polarity, as when a neuron develops an axon at one
end and dendrites at the other. Not surprisingly, the microtubule
network itself is highly dynamic, adjusting rates of assembly and
disassembly in what is known as “dynamic instability” to facilitate
the desired transportation.
CELLS AND CELL PRODUCTS INTO TISSUES AND ORGANS
A tissue is a collection of cells and cell products that func-
tion together to carry out a limited and specific function. The
four primary tissue types are epithelia, connective tissues, mus-
cle tissue, and neural tissue (Martini et al., 2006). Two or more
tissues combine to form an organ with a more complex vital
function. Tissues represent a sub-level of biological organiza-
tion since the functionality of organs relies upon individual cells
such as macrophages, neurons, and lymphocytes in addition to
component tissues (Alberts et al., 2004).
Cell tags come in the form of molecules expressed on the sur-
face of cells. Expression of different types of cell surface molecules
known as cell adhesion molecules determines which cells are able
to stick together. Other cell surface molecules are functional tags
that determine the functional role of a cell within the context of
an organ. For example, B cells of the immune system are able to
proliferate and produce antibodies in response to a pathogen due
to expression of a specific B cell surface receptor (Murphy et al.,
2008). Other tags that determine how a cell will function within
a tissue or organ include aspects of its differentiation manifested
by features such as polarity and type of protein secretions.
Organizers include a variety of molecular processes both
within and between cells. A specific example of a protein that
is central to the organization of cells into tissues is a member
of the cadherin family of cell adhesion molecules known as Fat.
Fat prevents cells from becoming too large, and guides planar
cell polarity within a tissue such as epithelia (Sopko and McNeill,
2009). For organs, recent research suggests that different “organ
identity genes” might direct the development of organs as biolog-
ical wholes, as has been shown for the gene Pha-4 for pharynx
development in the worm (Mango, 2009).
Several classes of junctions composed of clusters of cell adhe-
sion molecules, adaptor proteins, and branches of the cytoskele-
ton serve as attachers that physically hold cells together (Alberts
et al., 2004). Other attachers include components of the extracel-
lular matrix deposited by cells, such as proteoglycans that have
even been termed “intercellular cement,” more complex connec-
tive tissue, and the simple physical interlocking of membranes as
occurs in some types of epithelia (Martini et al., 2006).
Communicators are any entities that move between compo-
nents within a tissue or organ. These include migratory cells such
as many cells of the immune system (Murphy et al., 2008), as
well asmolecules and ions that allow intercellular communication
within a tissue or organ, for example, neurotransmitters between
neurons in the brain.
The relationship between cells and tissues or organs involves
ongoing, dynamic interactions. We have already discussed inter-
actions involving intercellular communication within tissues and
cell movement within organs. For tissue maintenance, the cel-
lular components of tissues classified as renewal such as the
epidermis of the skin contain a proliferative zone of stem cells
that continuously replace a population of short-lived differen-
tiated cells (Slack, 2006). Even tissues classified as post-mitotic
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and expanding need to be replenished to certain extents. As with
molecules, new cells need to be tagged, organized, attached, and
moved if they are communicators, in order to contribute to func-
tional tissues and organs. Furthermore, in order to survive and
remain functional, cells of established tissue must continually
receive signals from their environment and respond appropri-
ately, express cell adhesion molecules to maintain appropriate
structural connections, and maintain patterns of gene expression
to allow retention of cellular identity by progeny cells.
Human brains consist of billions of cells, including neurons
and glial cells that provide nutrients and serve as attachers by
holding neurons in place. Among the most important kinds of
tags that neurons possess is their synaptic connections that enable
them to communicate with other neurons. Interconnections
among large numbers of neurons support high level mental
operations including both cognition and emotion (Schröder and
Thagard, in press; Thagard, 2010; Thagard and Schröder, forth-
coming). Neural functioning also enables brains to communicate
with other organs such as the heart and limbs.
ORGANS INTO ORGAN SYSTEMS AND INDIVIDUALS
Organs are formed into functional biological systems that work
together to collectively constitute a living individual organism.
Clusters of cells in the early embryo are tagged based on their early
commitments as one of the three primary germ layers (endo-
derm, mesoderm, and ectoderm). These very early tags influence
which cells will be grouped into a given biological system, and the
arrangement of organs within the body. Once humans are fully
developed, tags that determine an organ’s functionality include
the location that it is found within the body, its associations and
connections with other organs, and any specialized abilities. For
example, the heart’s functional tags include its location within
the chest, connection to major arteries and veins, and ability to
pump blood due to the contraction of cardiac muscle tissue and
the coordinated activities of its other tissue components.
Organizers that arrange organs into an organism are the com-
plex processes of growth and development. For example, as the
diaphragm develops it separates organs of the thoracic cavity
from those of the abdominopelvic cavity (Martini et al., 2006).
Evolutionary constraints on development contribute to what is
known as the vertebrate body plan and explain common features
and morphology of vertebrates (Slack, 2006). The body plan is
believed to represent a real feature of organization as evidenced by
the highly conservedHox genes. These genes encode transcription
factors important in body patterning during various develop-
mental stages (Voet et al., 2008). The functional organizers of
biological systems are processes that connect parts in functional
relationships such as angiogenesis (the formation of new blood
vessels). Such organizers allow the flow of communicators such as
blood and lymph (both specialized connective tissues) and hor-
mones that can cause effects across organs in a biological system
or throughout the body. Structural attachers that maintain organs
in their proper arrangements within an organism include body
cavities that house organs, connective tissues that support them,
and membranes that line them (Martini et al., 2006).
Dynamics involve restricted movement of organs such as the
beating of the heart or swelling of the fed stomach. The internal
body cavities provide a low friction environment for organs to
expand or move into. An example is the pericardial cavity that
supports the beating heart, making slippery contacts with the
heart and the surrounding tissues. At the lower levels discussed
so far, components are recycled over relatively short periods of
time. However, organs such as the heart and liver do not nor-
mally spontaneously cease to function or exist as wholes much
like most molecules and cells do at some point in time. Nor
are they instantaneously replaced by substitute organs waiting in
the wings. Instead entire organs are replenished gradually by the
renewal of lower level components such as cells and molecules.
INDIVIDUAL ORGANISMS INTO SOCIAL GROUPS
Our schema for part-whole relations also applies to social groups,
which consist of collections of individual organisms. Non-human
animals form groups such as herds, packs, flocks, and schools
of fish. Human individuals collect into functional social groups
such as companies, families, teams, congregations, and circles of
friends. For humans, the tags include physical features, behav-
ioral characteristics, contextual cues and mental representations
that help people identify other individuals as relatives, friends, or
coworkers. The principal organizers involved include brain pro-
cesses relevant to planning, such as memories, emotions, values,
and goals. We need these cognitive processes to plan, compre-
hend, judge, and understand our interactions with others and
arrange ourselves in functional groups that allow us to meet our
goals as social creatures. Other organizers are events and processes
such as family dinners, parties, and religious rituals. The attach-
ers in social groups are primarily emotional representations that
people have of each other that establish social bonds, for example
in couples, families, and teams (Thagard, 2012, in press). Other
attachers include places and events that hold people together
in social groups, such as houses, office buildings, and places of
worship.
Communicators at the social level include sound waves that
convey words from one person to another, as well as modern
devices such as telephones and computers. As shown in Figure 2,
the relation between individuals and social groups is primarily
functional, like the relation between organs and biological sys-
tems such as the respiratory system, not mainly structural like the
relation between cells and organs. Nevertheless, the part-whole
schema still applies, as the functions of social groups arise from
the tags, organizers, attachers, and communicators that make the
individuals into a group.
Social groups obviously involve complex dynamics. New
members can join a group and old ones can leave. Individuals
within a group can alsomove physically, interacting with different
individuals of the group over the course of a social gathering. An
individual’s relationship relative to others within the group can
also change. For example, an individual with the relation mother
in a family can add grandmother to her identity upon her daugh-
ter having a child, or an assistant within a corporation can be
promoted to executive. Moreover, these dynamics depend on the
extraordinarily complex brain processes that mediate individuals’
evolving relationships with others. For example, memories of oth-
ers can be formed, remembered correctly or incorrectly, and even
forgotten entirely. Over the span of a century, virtually none of the
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individual members of a given social group stay the same, yet the
traditions and rituals that define social groups such as families,
religious groups, and corporations can remain strong.
CONSTITUTION AND EMERGENCE
The application of our schema to six different levels of organiza-
tion supports its plausibility as a general account of part-whole
relations. We now use it to address important problems concern-
ing the nature of constitution and emergence. The part-whole
schema provides an understanding of emergence that is an alter-
native both to reductionism, according to which wholes can be
fully explained in terms of their parts, and to holism, accord-
ing to which wholes can be understood without considering the
operations of their parts.
Constitution of parts into wholes requires the whole com-
plex of tags, organizers, attachers, and communicators. The tags
of the parts allow them to be organized by forces and processes
and attached together into wholes in which communicators pro-
vide additional interactions among parts. As a result, the wholes
can have emergent properties, which are properties that belong
to the wholes, do not belong to any of the parts, and are not
aggregates of properties of the parts (cf. Bunge, 2003; Wimsatt,
2007). In contrast, an aggregate property is a simple sum: for
example, the weight of a table is just the sum of the weights of
the pieces of the table. Emergent properties differ from aggre-
gates because they arise from three kinds of interactions among
parts: organizing, attaching, and communicating. Constitution
is a relation that results from many mechanisms responsible
for organizing, attaching, and communication. Table 2 provides
examples of constitution and emergence at six levels, and the next
section goes into more detail concerning how individuals make
up social groups.
FAMILIES AND THE PEOPLE/GROUP PROBLEM
One of the key problems in social science is the relation between
individual people and the social groups to which they belong,
which we will call the people/group problem, although it could
just as well be called the psychological/social problem or the
agent/structure problem. It can be stated in different ways,
including:
1. What is the relation between individual agents and social
structures such as institutions and states (see e.g., Giddens,
1984; Giddens, Wendt, 1999).
2. What is the relation between the psychology of individual
humans (which contemporary cognitive science understands
in terms of mental representations and processes) and the
investigation of social changes carried out in fields such as
sociology, anthropology, economics, and political science?
The two most prominent and extreme accounts of the relation
between the social and the psychological are the methodologi-
cal individualist, reductionist view that everything social is just
the actions of individual people, and the post-modernist, holist
view that psychological reality is a matter of social construction.
We will show that our part-whole schema provides an alternative
answer to the people/group problem by considering a particularly
important kind of social group—families.
Table 2 | Examples of constitution and emergence.
Parts Whole Constitution Emergent properties
Subatomic
particles
Atom The mass and charge of particles allow them to be
organized by fundamental forces and attached by field
carriers into whole atoms
Atoms are capable of bonding into molecules
Atoms Molecule The electron densities of atoms allow them to be
organized by chemical reactions and attached by
covalent bonds into whole molecules
Molecules may be different states of matter (gas,
liquid, solid) from their collections of atoms
Molecules Organelle/cell The chemical properties of the molecules allow them
be organized by chemical reactions and attached by
the cytoskeleton into whole cells in which proteins
and ions provide communication
Cells are able to survive by obtaining energy and to
reproduce by division
Cells and
cellular
products
Tissue/organ The locations and surface molecules of cells allow
them to be organized by processes such as migration
and attached by junctions into whole tissues or organs
in which small molecules provide communication
Organs are able to accomplish complex biological
functions such as pumping blood
Organs Organ sys-
tem/individual
organism
Organs develop in specific locations within the body
where attachers such as connective tissue and
communicators such as hormones allow them to
function as organ systems within an organism
Organ systems are able to accomplish even more
complex biological functions such as providing
nutrients to a whole organism
Individual
organisms
Social group The physical and behavioral properties of organisms
allow them to be organized by events and institutions
and attached by environments and mental states into
social wholes in which sounds and other signals
provide communication
Social groups are capable of collective actions such
as animal swarming, human politics, and economic
markets
The examples given are illustrative, not comprehensive: at each level there are other cases of constitution and emergence than the ones presented in the table.
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All human cultures have families (Brown, 1991), making them
the most pervasive kind of social group. A family is obviously a
whole whose parts are the people who belong to it, but what are
the tags, organizers, attachers, and communicators? To simplify
the analysis, we will consider the typicalWestern family consisting
of two parents and a few children, but it would be straightforward
to broaden the account to the more diverse, extended families
found in various cultures.
Tags are properties of parts that provide identities enabling the
parts to be assembled and maintained as wholes. The properties
of people that enable them to belong to families are physiologi-
cal, behavioral, psychological, and neuromolecular. Physiological
differences enable people to recognize individuals. People need
behaviors such as talking and touching to function as members
of families, but these behaviors result from psychological mecha-
nisms, which in turn depend on underlying neural mechanisms.
The psychological mechanisms, according to research in cognitive
science, are computational processes that operate on many kinds
of mental representations including concepts, beliefs, goals, atti-
tudes, and emotions (see e.g., Thagard, 2005; Smith and Kosslyn,
2007). All of these can contribute to the identifications that form
people into families.
The concepts that people need to function as parts of a typ-
ical Western family include wife, husband, father, son, daughter,
and family itself. Categorizing oneself as a parent or child pro-
vides a way of thinking of oneself in relation to the family. These
categories are tied to emotional attitudes about the roles that
people play in the family, and family stability depends on the
existence of emotional bonds deriving from positive attitudes
about being a spouse or a child. These cognitive/emotional mech-
anisms depend on biological processes that are both neural and
molecular. For example, coupling depends on molecular pro-
cesses involving neurotransmitters such as dopamine (for positive
attitudes) and hormones such as oxytocin (for bonding).
Merely having these tags, however, does not suffice to estab-
lish and maintain groups like families. From the perspective of
our part-whole schema, formation of families requires organiz-
ers, which are forces and processes that bring parts together
into relationships. The organizers for families in Western soci-
eties are multiple and diverse, including at least the following.
The forces behind family formation include sexual desire, need
for relatedness or belonging, and motivation to satisfy social
expectations. The processes by which people form into couples
include social practices such as schooling, work, parties, danc-
ing, and dating. Marriage rituals, whether religious or secular,
provide public occasions for social recognition of the formation
of a family. The expansion of a family by addition of chil-
dren requires both psychological processes, such as the desire
to reproduce or at least to have sex, and social processes such
as assistance in childbirth by medical personnel and hospitals.
Adoption is another social process by which a family can be
expanded.
Note that whereas the tags behind families are largely the
psychological properties of individuals, the organizers for fami-
lies include social processes as well as psychological ones. Hence
it should be clear that the account of families based on our
part-whole schema does not attempt to reduce families to their
individual members, because social processes such as schooling,
rituals, and healthcare are crucial to the organizing of families.
In our part-whole schema, attachers are forces, processes, or
entities that hold parts together, and the maintenance of families
depends on multiple attachers. Some of these are psychologi-
cal and neural, such as the representational and neurochemical
processes that underlie people staying in love, whose neural
mechanisms include activity in brain reasons rich in dopamine
(Fisher, 2004). Other processes are social, such as the legal sta-
tus of marriage which makes dissolution of families non-trivial.
For young children, physical and psychological dependency are
powerful attachers that naturally wane with maturity. Despite the
independence of grown children, family identity can be main-
tained through ongoing social interactions such as family dinners
and other visits, including ones associated with family or cultural
rituals.
These connections depend on communicators that allow inter-
actions among physically separated parts. Besides speech, com-
munication between family members can take place through
music and many kinds of technology, including mail, telephones,
e-mail, and Internet-based chat. Such communication depends
on individual tags that enable people to generate and receive mes-
sages, including the psychological processes required for language
production and comprehension.
Families illustrate how constitution of parts into wholes
requires the whole complex of tags, organizers, attachers, and
communicators. The tags of the parts allow them to be orga-
nized by forces and processes and attached together into wholes
in which communicators provide additional interactions among
parts. Consider the property of being a happy family, which has
both an aggregate and an emergent interpretation. As an aggre-
gate property, a happy family is just one in which all the individ-
uals are happy, but there is also a more interesting interpretation
in which the happiness of the family results from ongoing inter-
actions between individuals based on processes of organizing,
attaching, and communicating. The happiness of the family as a
whole depends on how its members treat each other. Similarly,
a dysfunctional family need not be one in which each of the
individuals is dysfunctional; rather, the interrelations among the
individuals render the family dysfunctional. Family conflict is
obviously not a property of individuals, but an ongoing process
depending on how individuals interact.
We have given only a cursory account of how individuals
function in families, but it suffices to show the applicability of
our part-whole schema to a fundamental kind of social group.
Expanded accounts could be given of many other kinds of
social organization, including institutions and even nations. Our
answer to the people/group problem is that people constitute
groups by virtue of a large array of tags, organizers, attachers,
and communicators. Many of these factors are neuropsycholog-
ical, but social interactions are also a crucial part of the story
of how families consist of people. Mental representations such
as concepts and emotions are needed to explain the formation
and maintenance of groups, but also highly relevant are social
practices that depend both on the representations that people
have of each other and on the various kinds of interactions
that bring and keep people together. We hope it is clear that
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our account is neither simplistically reductionist nor mystically
holistic, but rather shows that the part-whole schema supports
a rich, multilevel account of the relation between people and
groups.
CONCLUSION
Philosophers have debated the nature of parts and wholes since
Plato (Harte, 2002; Wasserman, 2009). Our account is broadly
compatible with many recent discussions of parts and wholes in
relation to mechanisms and levels in recent philosophy of sci-
ence (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson, 1993; Bunge, 2003; Bechtel,
2006, 2008; Darden, 2006; Craver, 2007; Craver and Bechtel, 2007;
Wimsatt, 2007; Winther, 2011). However, it goes beyond these
discussions in providing a more detailed account that operates at
all scientific levels, from the atomic to the social, and in specifying
the properties of parts (tags) that allow them to be organized into
wholes and maintained as wholes by processes of attachment and
communication. These specifications have enabled us to describe
how part-whole relations operate in an important kind of social
structure, the family.
Our science-based part-whole scheme is very different from
the conceptual, a priori accounts of parts and whole offered in
analytic metaphysics (e.g., Simons, 1987; Sider, 2007; Varzi, 2009;
Schaffer, 2010). Such accounts lead to broad claims incompatible
with scientific discourse, such as that wholes are prior to parts and
that everything is a part of itself. In contrast, we have attempted
to characterize how parts make up wholes by looking at examples
from a broad range of sciences.
The resulting part-whole schema shows how constitution is
established and maintained at different levels, in ways that are
dynamically dependent on ongoing causal interactions. Instead of
taking constitution as primitive, we have provided a scientifically
realistic account of the structures and processes that make parts
into wholes. This account has served to illuminate the nature of
social structures such as families, demonstrating the commonal-
ity of part-whole relations from the atomic level to the biological
and social.
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